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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and cash dividend payment in newly listed firms in China. Using 
142 initial public offerings (IPO) listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE), a dynamic panel Tobit regression is employed. The result shows 
that large, profitable IPOs with large boards and a high proportion of 
independent and female directors and CEO duality are willing to pay high 
dividends to their shareholders. This study indicates the requirement for 
the promulgation or streamlining of corporate laws in emerging markets to 
reduce the possibility of expropriation of minority shareholders by politically 
powered large shareholders. 
Keywords : Corporate governance, Initial Public offerings (IPO), China 
INTRODUCTION 
The role of corporate governance in affecting dividend policy has been 
a subject of interest. Most of the previous research has shown that the 
patterns of corporate dividend payout policies vary tremendously between 
developed and emerging markets. This paper investigates the relationship 
between corporate governance practices and dividend policy in Chinese 
firms, particularly those which are newly listed. 
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China has been undertaking a series of economic reforms during the past 
three decades, gradually moving from a centrally planned economy towards 
a market economy. The formation of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1990 was one of the key developments. 
Besides allowing enterprises to raise funds by issuing corporate bonds and 
stocks to the public, one of the main tasks for the government is to seek 
efficiency and productivity transformation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
through economic and shareholding reforms. The massive privatization of 
state-owned enterprises in China provides an interesting case study of initial 
public offerings (IPOs) because of its importance in the transition from 
socialism to a modern market economy. However, being transformed from 
SOEs into public firms does not guarantee that the conduct and practices 
of the governance will be different. Eventually, an ineffective governance 
system has been widely believed as the root cause of corporate China's 
lackluster performance. Improving corporate governance is one of the most 
important tasks of China's continued reform. 
To improve corporate governance, the government obviously has an 
important role to play, for example in strengthening laws that protect 
shareholder interests and beefing up enforcement of such laws and 
regulations. Therefore, it is interesting to examine the corporate governance 
practice in newly listed firms, particularly in affecting dividend policy. There 
are many reasons this study considers only dividend policy in emerging 
market IPOs. One is that usually newly listed firms tend to retain their 
earnings for only a few years after their listing, and consequently firms suffer 
from free cash flow and expropriation problem; to mitigate these problems 
good corporate governance is needed. Since it is a new firm operating in an 
emerging market it is assumed that the corporate governance mechanisms 
are not fully complied. In addition, investigating the corporate governance 
impact on dividend policy in emerging markets is significant, because the 
equity markets in emerging markets are less mature, have information 
opaqueness and are more volatile. 
An IPO occurs when the equity demand of firms can no longer be satisfied 
by individual or family owners. Then firms can raise capital from outside 
investors with no existing liquid market. Nevertheless, going public leads 
to increased potential costs of separation of ownership and control of the 
firm. Information asymmetry, conflict of interest and free cash flow problems 
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are highly correlated with separation of ownership and control. Apart from 
that, there are plenty of opportunities for the controlling shareholders to 
divert firm resources for individual or family use, because before the IPO 
stage most of the firms belong to one large individual or family owners. 
Therefore, firms prefer to pay high dividend as a governance control 
mechanism that limits corporate insiders' self-serving actions. In 1998, 
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
issued its influential OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, which 
are intended to assist member and non-member countries in their efforts 
to evaluate and improve the legal, institutional and regulatory framework 
for better corporate governance. Along with that, corporate governance has 
also gained unparalleled importance in China. 
The Chinese government opened stock exchanges in the early 1990s in 
order to raise capital and improve operating performance for state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). By December 2011, one of China's stock markets had 
emerged as the fifth largest in the world, with market capitalization of 
over US$2 trillion. Chinese companies, especially SOEs, have benefited 
tremendously from the rapid growth in issuance and general public's 
enthusiasm for the equity market. Nevertheless, the regulations over stock 
markets have been evolving to address the trade-off between growth and 
control. The Chinese listed firms suffer from weak protection of minority 
shareholders and poor corporate governance (Allen, Qian, & Qian, 2005), 
such as state-owned equity control and conflicts of interests between 
large dominant shareholders and public shareholders, due to the specific 
characteristics of the Chinese listed firms. Even though issuance approval, 
pricing and placement systems have been significantly liberalized, they are 
still tightly controlled compared to other Asian markets. As controlled as 
it is, poor governance practices are still rampant among the Chinese listed 
companies. Moreover, a study of Chinese IPOs is interesting for three 
main reasons. First, China has experienced large scale IPOs in past years. 
Second, addressing and understanding the corporate governance impact on 
emerging market IPOs is both interesting and important because emerging 
markets' institutional structures are different from those of developed 
markets. Third, a distinguish feature of Chinese IPOs is that nearly all 
firms are restructured from state-owned or state-controlled enterprises 
(Wang, 2004). Hence, a pyramid ownership structure and expropriation 
is common. After control potential endogeneity, this study finds that 
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corporate governance is a significant determinant of the dividend policy in 
Chinese IPOs. In addition, this study provides evidence that agency theory 
is superior to signalling theory in dividend payment decisions in emerging 
market IPOs. Overall, this study finds that large profitable IPOs, with large 
boards and a high proportion of independent directors, pay high dividends 
to their shareholders. Furthermore, this study finds that boards with a high 
proportion of female directors and boards where there is CEO duality are 
willing to pay high dividends to their shareholders. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Its findings offer 
new evidence on corporate governance practices and dividend policy, 
with particular reference to IPOs in China. Although the IPO phenomenon 
has caught many researchers' attention, few studies look at the function 
of corporate governance and IPO firms. Using an extensive dataset on 
Chinese IPO, this study improves our understanding of the effectiveness 
of recent corporate governance recommendations in an emerging market 
IPO context, as well as related practical suggestions for IPOs' governance. 
Finally, this study controls the endogeneity effect of corporate governance 
practices in small firms and their dividend-payment, whereas the majority of 
recent studies have ignored the endogeneity effect of corporate governance, 
even though some explored the use of the 2SLS regression technique; 
consequently, the econometric analysis employed in this study is more 
robust. 
The next section reviews prior research and develops the hypotheses, and 
is followed by discussion of data, variables, methods and procedures used 
for this empirical study. The results and conclusion then follow. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Dividend policy and the role of dividend announcements has attracted 
considerable attention in prior literature since the seminal work of Modigliani 
and Miller (1958). So far there is significant empirical evidence suggesting 
that management can use the dividend as a signalling mechanism as well 
as a mechanism to control insider expropriation. Recently, there has been 
growing literature in both developed and developing markets that has sought 
to determine the link between dividend policy, firm characteristics and 
corporate governance practices (Aivazian, Booth, & Cleary, 2003; La-Porta, 
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Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). With respect to the dividend 
policy, the existing literature suggests that firms from developed economies 
adopt high dividend pay-out policy to decrease agency conflicts between 
corporate insiders and corporate outsiders. This is because in firms with 
widespread ownership structure there is conflict between firms' managers 
and firms' shareholders. Firms in emerging markets tend to pay a high 
dividend, because it will help to reduce agency conflicts between majority 
and minority shareholders because closely controlled firms' controlling 
shareholders often collide with those of the firms' minority shareholders. 
Corporate governance and dividends in China. 
It is generally known that firms that operate in an environment with weak 
legal protection and institutional settings tend to have less stable dividend 
policies (Cesari, 2009). Moreover, due to rapid growth of young firms in 
emerging markets, capital accumulation and expansion leads to restricted 
dividend payment. Using Chinese listed firms, Shao and Lin (2004) state 
that fewer dividend initiations and lower dividend payment are prevalent 
in Chinese market. However, recently the Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) encouraged listed firms to establish long term cash 
dividend payments through the introduction of new regulatory reforms. 
As a first step, CSRC released "Measures for the Administration of the 
Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies" (2001) and stated that the 
underwriters of common equity must pay close attention to the refinancing 
applications by the companies who fail to pay dividends or boards of 
directors who did not provide justifiable explanations. Furthermore, in 2004, 
the CSRC stated that if a company had not paid cash dividends in the past 
three years, firm refinancing will not be approved. Recently, "Measures 
for the administration of the Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies" 
(2006) promulgated new rules and indicated that issuance of new shares 
by Chinese listed companies shall be consistent with the provision that the 
companies' accumulatively distributed cash or stock dividends over the 
past three years must be higher than 20% of the average realized annual 
distributed profits. In addition, the unique ownership structures of Chinese 
IPOs (where non tradable shares represent more than 60% of outstanding 
shares) suggest that the cash dividend payment is the primary source of 
return to the non-tradable shareholders (Chen, Jin, & Xu, 2009; He, Li, 
Shi, & Twite, 2009). Hence, in recent decades, Chinese listed firms show 
positive signs of cash dividend pay-outs. 
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Apart from the above reasons, prior literature suggests corporate governance 
practices may have significant impact on firm dividend payment (Gugler & 
Yurtoglu, 2003; Mitton, 2004). Mitton (2004) finds that an increase in a firm 
corporate governance rating is associated with an average four percentage 
point increase in dividend payment of emerging market firms. Further, he 
finds that comparing firms with the worst corporate governance practices 
and those with the best corporate governance practice, the dividend pay-out 
ratio for firms with best governance practice is 22 per cent higher than firms 
with the worst governance practice. This result is consistent with Faccio, 
Lang and Young (2001), because good corporate governance practices limit 
expropriation through dividend pay-out. 
In the late nineteen hundred's the size and the structure of corporate boards 
received much attention, fuelled by the financial crisis and business failures 
of large companies. It was found that board monitoring and controlling 
activities can increase as more directors are added. However, according to 
Coles, McWilliams and Sen (2001), large board size increases firm financial 
performance when a firm operates in a complex environment. Moreover, in 
the Chinese context, Li and Naughton (2007) find that board size positively 
impacts on IPO performance. Further, using Chinese listed firms, Howe 
and Olsen (2006) indicate firms with higher dividend payment ratios have 
large boards. This may be due to high monitoring activities of large boards' 
leading to reduced ability to expropriate firm wealth. Similar to corporate 
governance systems of other East-Asian countries, China's is characterised 
by the emerging market corporate governance model, which shows highly 
concentrated equity ownership, pyramided ownership and weak institutional 
structure. Hence, a large board may increase monitoring activities through 
increasing a firm's cash pay-out, which constrains corporate insiders' ability 
to expropriate outsiders, mitigating agency problems. 
The independent directors play supervisory and balancing roles, controlling 
the activities of the executive directors and the board in general. Policy 
statements, namely the Cadbury Report (1992), the Greenbury Report 
(1995) and the Hampel Report (1998), emphasise the board monitoring 
responsibility of independent directors. Independent directors help to ensure 
managerial accountability of shareholders (Young, 2000). Consequence, 
increasing trends of independent directors can be observed in last ten years. 
After introduced CSRC (2001) regulations regarding independent directors 
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with the objective of introducing better corporate governance practices and 
protecting the interest of minority shareholders, Chinese firms (through 
higher pay-out of the dividends) show dramatic increases of independent 
directors on their boards (Bhabra & Li, 2010; Chen & Zhang, 2002). This 
is consistent with Howe and Olsen (2006), who find that a higher degree 
of director independence leads to high performance of Chinese IPOs. This 
is may be consistent with La-Porta et al's (2000) substitution hypothesis, 
whereby directors' independence leads to a high dividend pay-out as a 
substitute for other corporate governance mechanisms of firms. 
In recent years, board gender diversity has become the subject of a number 
of empirical studies. Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader (2003) find that the 
percentage of female directors is positively related to two accounting 
measures in larger US firms; return on assets and return on investments. 
Similar to the above result, Adams and Ferreira (2009) posit gender diversity 
and firms' financial performance have a significant positive relationship 
when measured as Tobin's Q and ROA. Therefore, firms with more female 
directors on their board may have high cash flows, and to reduce free cash 
flow problems they may pay high dividends to their shareholders. Moreover, 
boards with a high proportion of female directors may reduce impediments 
for dividend pay-out. This may be because boards with female directors are 
inclined to ask many questions and increase board independence (Carter, 
Simkins, & Simpson, 2003). Therefore, managers cannot use firm cash flow 
for their own interests. 
With the outbreak of large US corporate scandals in early this decade, 
CEO duality received more attention, due to powerful CEOs abusing their 
extensive power by expropriating from the company assets and shareholders. 
Most of the European corporations increased pressure on regulators to 
separate CEO and chairman roles. Based on the agency theory, Fama and 
Jensen (1983) suggest that CEO duality hinders a board's ability to monitor 
management and therefore increases the agency problem. In respect to 
dividend pay-out, Howe and Olsen (2006) find that one person holding 
the chairman and CEO positions leads to an increase in the high dividend 
pay-out ratio. This may be because to reduce expropriation, firms initiate 
more dividend payments. Furthermore, according to the stewardship theory, 
the impact of CEO power concentration on firm performance is positive 
in early stages, and the influence becomes more negative as a firm's life 
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cycle matures, supporting the agency theory. Therefore, according to the 
stewardship theory IPOs with CEO duality may prefer to pay more benefits 
to investors through dividends. 
Dividend pay-out policy may become highly important as a monitoring 
vehicle in profitable firms. Using Polish listed firms, Kowalewski, Stetsyuk 
and Talavera (2007) find that more profitable firms tend to have a high 
cash dividend pay-out ratio. This may be because cash dividends coincide 
with a reduction in the risk of a firm's expropriation. Further, firm size has 
significant impact on firm dividend policy (Eriotis, 2005; Kowalewski et 
al, 2007). Eriotis (2005) explains that Greek firms' dividend pay-out ratio 
is influenced by distributed earnings and size of the firms. 
According to the corporate governance mechanisms and dividend pay-out, 
the hypotheses for this study are formulated as follows: 
Hrm IPOs with large board size tend to pay high cash dividends 
H2: IPOs with more independent directors tend to pay high cash 
dividends 
H3: IPOs with more female directors tend to pay high cash dividends 
H4: IPOs with CEO duality tend to pay high cash dividends 
METHODOLOGY 
Data and sample selection 
The IPOs listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) from 2001 to 2005 
were collected in this study. The SZSE belongs to 28 major stock exchanges 
in the world. The majority of SZSE IPOs' applications come from successful 
high-tech private companies seeking wider share ownership. Data were 
collected from the Guotaian Research Service Center (GTARSC). From 
the selected period IPO listed only five years, which are 2001-2005. From 
2001 to 2005, there was a market slump effect in China, and at this time 
IPO listed in Chinese stock exchanges significantly decreased compared to 
economically healthy years. In this time period there were only 142 IPOs 
listed in SZSE, and without any selection bias this study includes all 142 
IPOs. The relevant corporate governance data for each IPO are collected 
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from Guotaian Research Service Center. After complied dividend pay-out 
and corporate governance data, approximately above 426 observations 
create a weakly balanced panel. 
Variables 
This study includes three dividend pay-out proxies which are highly 
employed in prior literature. Following Kowalewski et al. (2007) this study 
used dividend to sales (DIVSAL) and dividend to earnings (DIVEAR) 
as dividend pay-out proxies and they are calculated as cash dividend 
to total sales of the IPO and cash dividend to total earnings of the IPO 
respectively. Following He et al (2009), this study also used dividend to 
share (DIVSHARE) as proxy for dividend pay-out ratio. It is calculated as 
cash dividend to total outstanding share. 
To find out if corporate governance impacts on dividend pay-out ratio, this 
study uses board size, independent directors' percentage, female directors' 
percentage and CEO duality variables as corporate governance explanatory 
variables. Board size (BSIZE) is calculated as the logarithm of total number 
of board members. Independent directors' percentage (INDEP) is calculated 
as the number of independent directors divided by the total number of 
board directors. Female director percentage (FEMALE) is calculated as the 
number of female directors divided by the total number of board directors. 
To capture CEO duality, a CEO duality variable was created. CEO is equal 
to 1 if CEO duality is present; otherwise, it is set equal to zero. 
Apart from the corporate governance variables, this study employed the 
following control variables as well. The first control variable, firm size 
(SIZE), is calculated as a natural logarithm of total sales. To capture the 
year effect this study used 5 year dummy variables representing 2001 to 
2005. Furthermore, following Kowalewski et al (2007), this study used 
ROA and Tobin's Q as explanatory variables of dividend policy. Following 
Huang and Song (2006), ROA is defined as earnings before interest and tax 
divided by total assets. This study expects a positive relationship between 
ROA and dividend payment because ROA reflects the availability of 
resources to distribute once investment funding is secured, which should 
increase dividend payment. In this paper, following (McKnight & Weir, 
2008), Tobin's Q ratio is defined as market capitalisation plus total debt 
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divided by total assets. High Tobin's Q is used as proxy for the firm's growth 
opportunities, hence this study expects negative impact on high Tobin's Q 
for dividends pay-out ratio. 
Panel Tobit regression 
Most of the literature uses the Tobit model as an econometric model to 
describe the relationship between non-negative dependent variables and 
independent variables. According to Drakos and Bekiris (2010), it is 
rational to treat board composition, board size and leadership structure 
as endogenous. This would involve identifying instruments that are 
variables that are correlated with the key independent variables but that are 
otherwise uncorrelated with the dependent variable. Therefore, a dynamic 
panel Tobit model is used as regression analysis to test the relationship 
between corporate governance factors and firm dividend payment. The 
cross-sectional non-dynamic Tobit model introduced by Tobin (1958) can 
be represented as follows. 
r i - A , + *, (i) 
F. = m a x { r ,r} 
Where Y* is a latent variable, this latent dependent variable has a linear 
relationship with x. via a parameter /? which determines the relationship 
between the dependent variable and independent latent variable. Y represents 
an observed dependent variable, and r is a known constant. The normally 
distributed error term is denoted by £/.. In a dynamic panel data set, the 
Tobit model can be explained as follows: 
V ^ + ^ - i ^ - r (2) 
Yu = m a x { r ,0} 
eit = d^uit t=l,...,T i=l,...,N 
Model (2) is characterized by lagged latent dependent variables. The 
component d. is an unobserved individual specific random disturbance 
which is constant over time, and is an idiosyncratic error which varies 
across time and individuals. Chang (2002) assumes that d. and are Gaussian 
conditional xa xiT on. The one common approach for estimating the 
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dynamic panel Tobit model is the fixed effect. Honore (1993) posits that 
although a fixed effect Tobit model is valid under weak restrictions on the 
unobservable heterogeneity, it has major limitations; the model with the 
time-dummies' variables cannot be estimated consistently. Further, Hu 
(2003) explains that a dynamic panel Tobit with lagged latent dependent 
variables and a fixed effects estimator creates more problems. The second 
possible method for estimating the dynamic panel Tobit model is the random 
effects approach. By specifying the distribution of the error conditional 
on the regressors, the random effects estimators can be obtained through 
maximizing the corresponding likelihood functions (Geweke & Keane, 
2000; Lillard & Willis, 1978). A random effects Tobit estimator has the 
following advantages. First, time-invariant, time-varying, and time-
dummies' variables can be incorporated in the model and they can be 
estimated constantly using the simulation estimator. Secondly, this method 
allows for complicated dynamic panels, possibly with more than one lag 
variable. Thirdly, it is a straightforward and easy way to accommodate serial 
correlations errors (Chang, 2002). 
RESULTS 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Variables obs mean Std. Dev min max 
Depended variables 
Dividend to sales (DIVSAL) 408 .0122918 .0182941 0 .086363 
Dividend to earning (DIVEAR) 426 .1102371 .2055344 0 1.5899 
Dividend to share 426 .0642723 .0954768 0 .5 
(DIVSHARE) 
Corporate governance 
variables 
Board size 426 9.438967 2.324758 2 17 
Log board size (BSIZE) 426 2.21263 .2619648 .6931472 2.833213 
Independent directors (INDEP) 426 .257094 .0404412 0 .75 
Female directors (FEMALE) 426 .0120083 .0147563 0 .12 
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CEO duality (CEO) 
Control variables 
ROA(ROA) 
Tobln's Q (Q) 
Firm size (SIZE) 
Y2001 
Y2002 
Y2003 
Y2004 
Y2005 
426 
426 
426 
426 
426 
426 
426 
426 
426 
.8075117 
.0407763 
2.589194 
1.95e+09 
.3661972 
.3450704 
.0070423 
.0070423 
.1012191 
.394718 
.0582884 
1.615099 
2.84e+09 
.4823307 
.4759502 
.0837204 
.0837204 
.1045055 
0 
-.3903 
.6965 
2.70e+08 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
.2716 
12.8508 
3.00e+10 
1 
1 
1 
1 
.6 
Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample data. The mean value 
of the DIVSAL ratio is only 1.2% and it varies between 0% to 8.6% only. 
Also the mean value of the DIVSHARE variable is low and is indicated at 
6.4%. Nevertheless, the mean value of the DIVEAR ratio is comparably 
higher than DIVSAL and DIVSHARE. However, it is still around 11%. 
This low dividends payment shows the severity of minority expropriation in 
Chinese IPOs. This may be caused, according to the La-Porta et al (2000), 
by countries with weak legal protection for minority shareholders paying 
lower dividends. Cited by Wei et al (2011), emerging economies increase 
low dividend payments, non-dividend payments and demonstrate irregular 
behavior for dividend payments. 
Further, Table 4.1 indicates IPO firm board size varies from 2 to 17 members 
and average board size is 9.4. This average board size of Chinese IPOs 
is consistent with the recommendations of the European and US codes 
for ideal board size, being between 5 and 15 members. This study reports 
that independent directors' mean value is 25% and it varies between 0 to 
75%. This indicates that Chinese IPOs still have more inside directors and 
corporate boards are not independent. Similar to other Asian countries, 
Chinese IPOs recruited few female board directors on their boards. Table 
I indicates the mean value of the FEMALE variable is 1.2% and it varies 
between 0 to 12% only. This finding is consistent with King (2010), and 
he explains that in China and India women in top companies hold a mere 
5 % of board seats. The mean value of non-CEO duality is 80.75%), which 
indicates that IPOs prefer non-CEO duality in firms. The mean value of 
ROA is around 0.04. This low ROA may be due to high costs of doing 
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business in emerging markets. However, mean Tobin's Q value is high and 
it shows as 2.59 and it varies between 0.7 and 12.9. This high Tobin's Q 
value indicates IPOs create value for their shareholders. 
Table 4.2: Panel Tobit regression results 
Variables 
Constant 
Corporate governance variables 
Log board size (BSIZE) 
Independent directors (INDEP) 
Female directors (FEMALE) 
CEO duality (CEO) 
Control variables 
ROA (ROA) 
Tobin's Q (Q) 
Firm size (SIZE) 
Y2001 
Y2002 
Y2003 
Y2004 
Y2005 
No 'of observations 
Regression Summary statistics 
Log likelihood 
Chi2 
DIVSAL 
.0034927 
(.0082476) 
.0012466** 
(.0042388) 
.0249315 
(.0198452) 
.284268* 
(.1795981) 
.0001809 
(.0023478) 
.0749268*** 
(.0169729) 
.0018322*** 
(.0005304) 
2.96-12** 
(4.12e-12) 
.0185394 
(.0031355) 
.0111519*** 
(.0029748) 
.0011016* 
(.0132873) 
.0115901 
(.0124867) 
-
416 
-1237.7091 
106.23*** 
DIVEAR 
.1419718* 
(.0846927) 
.0607173* 
(.0345393) 
.0046832 
(.0468937) 
.0097156** 
(.0100094) 
.5226394** 
(.0049863) 
.0661254 
(.1533939) 
-.0096555* 
(.0056016) 
1.76e-11*** 
(4.98e-12) 
.1226751 
(.0403608) 
.0696033** 
(.0396014) 
.289879** 
(.1854663) 
-.0669666 
(.1780574) 
-
416 
-1485.547 
156.12*** 
DIVSHARE 
.0033223 
(.0035087) 
-.0049956 
(.018016) 
.0891565*** 
(.0284881) 
-.0073243 
(.0050591) 
.0323774 
(.0440987) 
.3462688*** 
(.0863231) 
.0034808 
(.0032705) 
8.63e-13 
(2.18e-12) 
.0822905 
(.0164765) 
.0576777*** 
(.0155615) 
.0249488* 
(.0684361) 
.0485618 
(.0646471) 
-
416 
-1248.675 
210.58*** 
a weakly balanced panel; * Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant 
at 1% 
level; This model provides standard errors which are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.2 indicates dynamic Tobit regression results of corporate governance 
and dividend pay-out ratio. Column II reports the relationship of corporate 
governance and dividend to sales ratio. Column III reports the relationship 
of corporate governance and dividend to earnings ratio. Finally, Column IV 
reports the relationship of corporate governance and dividend to share ratio. 
Firm board size is found to be correlated with IPO dividend pay-out ratio 
in previous studies. In Table 4.2, column 2 shows 5% significant positive 
relationship between dividend to sales ratio and board size, indicating that 
a large board increases IPO dividend payment. Consistent with the above 
findings, column 3 indicates 10% significant positive relationship between 
dividend to earnings ratio and board size as well. One possible explanation 
for that is when firms have a large board it increases monitoring and 
distributes firm earnings as dividends to their shareholders. This finding 
is consistent with Howe and Olsen (2006) and Byoun, Chang and Kim 
(2012), who find that firms with large boards pay higher dividends to their 
shareholders. Although independent directors have no significant impact 
on dividend to sales and dividend to earnings ratios dependent proxies, 
it is 1% significantly positively related with dividend per share variable, 
which indicates that independent directors increase the IPO dividend 
payment ratio. This may be due to independent directors' close monitoring 
reducing controlling shareholders incentive to siphon resources out of the 
firms to increase their individual wealth. Hence, free cash flow needs to 
be distributed among shareholders as dividend. This leads to an increased 
dividend pay-out ratio of the Chinese IPOs. 
Table 4.2 indicates that female board directors are 10% significantly 
positively related with dividends to sales and dividends to earnings ratios. 
This finding is consistent with Byoun, Chang and Kim (2012), who find 
that firms with a high proportion of female directors on their boards are 
more likely to pay dividends and, further, tend to pay larger dividends than 
do those with non-female directors on boards. This indicates IPO firms 
with many female board directors on their board have high dividend pay-
out. According to Kandel and Lazear (1992), this may be because gender 
heterogeneity among board members enhances mutual monitoring and 
they serve as a "watchdog for shareholders". Accordingly, female board 
directors have the potential to help align the incentives of managers and 
shareholders through their impact on the pay-out policy. Additionally, Table 
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4.2 indicates that the CEO duality variable is 5% significantly positively 
related with dividend per earnings ratio. However, CEO duality shows a 
non-significant relationship with dividend per sales and dividend per share 
proxies. Overall, results indicate that if a single person holds both the CEO 
and chairmen role in a board, IPO leads to paying high dividends. A possible 
argument for this high dividend pay-out policy is that dividends are used as 
a signalling device (Battacharya, 1979). Usually, in firms with CEO duality, 
stakeholders assume firms practice weak corporate governance, and then the 
positive effect of CEO duality on dividend pay-out policy can be attributed 
to signalling rather than to monitoring. 
Firm performance variables, i.e. ROA and Tobin's Q, are significantly 
positively related with dividend per share and dividend per earnings, 
which indicates that high profitability IPOs have high dividend pay-out 
ratio. This finding is consistent with Naceur, Goaied and Belanes (2007) 
who find that the highly profitable firms with stable cash flows pay high 
dividends in Tunisia. This result is also complementary to the findings 
of Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) who interpret dividends as a method 
of limiting expropriation of insiders. Nevertheless, Tobin's Q variable is 
10% statistically significantly negatively related with dividend per earning 
variable. This may be because highly profitable IPOs may have high 
growth opportunities and they reinvest their money, hence the pay-out 
ratio decreases. 
Results indicate that the years 2002 and 2003 are positively related with 
all three dividend pay-out proxies, which indicates firms tend to pay high 
dividend in year 2002 and year 2003 compared with other years. This 
may be due to the CSRC issuing in January 2002 the Code of Corporate 
Governance of Listed Companies in China; most of the companies inclined 
to pay dividends to their shareholders. Hence, 2002 and 2003 show a positive 
impact on dividend payment. However, after the recent financial crisis, that 
dividend policy tendency of firms in all markets has decline dramatically. 
Hence, this study finds that after 2003, firm years are not significantly 
related with dividend proxies. 
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CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This empirical study demonstrates corporate governance is an important 
determinant in explaining the dividend policy of Chinese newly listed firms. 
In line with general predictions and controlling for other factors, this study 
finds that IPOs with large boards and high a proportion of independent 
directors and female directors are willing to pay a high dividend pay-out. 
This study's results for the remaining dividend determinants are in line with 
the corporate finance literature and expectations. Further, this study finds 
that highly profitable firms with CEO duality also prefer to pay-out their 
cash flows as dividends. Moreover, it clearly shows that Chinese government 
corporate governance reforms in 2002 have had a significant influence of 
dividend payments. However, overall statistics show most of the newly 
listed Chinese IPOs are reluctant to pay dividends. 
A sound legal system in a country helps to protect minority shareholders 
from majority shareholders' self-dealing behavior, such as excessive 
compensation, tunnelling and expropriation. Weak investor protection 
and weak creditor rights in the China market create high expropriation 
opportunities for closely held firms. De jure and de facto protection for 
creditors, investors and other related business parties need to be strengthened 
to avoid expropriation and tunnelling. Therefore, it is necessary to 
promulgate or streamline the corporate law system in China. Further, there 
is a need to increase transparency of the recruitment process to achieve 
the right skills for the company. Good corporate governance practices can 
improve transparency, accountability and fairness in corporate activities. It 
is important to have certified managers and directors trained in corporate 
governance practices. It would help China if it established an institute for 
corporate governance training. Through capacity building, enforcement 
and follow-up of corporate governance practices, creating a corporate 
governance rating system for investors and building up corporate governance 
awareness among business leaders will improve corporate governance 
practices in Chinese newly listed companies. A more efficient market with a 
strong corporate governance system may increase the costs of expropriation 
and tunnelling among newly listed firms. 
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LIMITATIONS 
Notwithstanding the findings, the current study does have limitations 
that point to potentially fruitful further research opportunities. First, this 
empirical result sheds new light on the importance of corporate governance 
practices, but the current study uses only a few aspects of corporate 
governance practices. Further studies could consider other corporate 
governance variables. Second, the findings are based on research in a single 
country and may not be generalizable. Further studies in both mature and 
emerging markets will be helpful in terms of international comparability. 
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